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Unlocking the Gaza Strip’s Economic 
Potential and Fostering Political Stability 
Europeans Should Seize the Opportunity of the Rapprochement between Fatah and Hamas 
Omar Shaban 
Although the UN report of 2012 projected that Gaza would be uninhabitable by 2020, 
Gaza is likely to collapse into a state of chaos domestically and renewed military con-
frontation with Israel much earlier. Gaza’s current reality is shaped by the aftermath of 
military clashes between Israel and Palestinian groups, the tightening of the blockade 
by Israel in 2007, the closure of the Rafah Crossing by Egypt, and the international com-
munity’s no-contact policy towards Hamas. This has created a situation of isolation, in 
which the infrastructure as well as the social and political fabrics in the Gaza Strip have 
suffered. Gaza’s once export-oriented economy is now largely defunct, with the popula-
tion impoverished and dependent on foreign aid. These factors pose serious threats to 
domestic stability, to Palestinian unity, and to the stability of the sub-region. Immedi-
ate intervention by the EU is needed to alleviate the humanitarian crisis, advance Pales-
tinian reconciliation, and lift the Israeli blockade. The current rapprochement between 
Fatah and Hamas offers opportunities for the Europeans to engage. 
 
Over the last 10 years, the Israeli-imposed 
blockade and the Palestinian factional divi-
sion have strongly impacted Gaza’s economy 
and society and have negatively affected 
the Palestinian national project. In January 
2006, Hamas (the Islamic Resistance Move-
ment) had won the second legislative elec-
tions and then formed its first-ever govern-
ment in March 2006, ending the domi-
nance of its rival Fatah movement over the 
Palestinian leadership since the 1960s. Sub-
sequently, large parts of the international 
community announced a “no contact policy” 
towards the Hamas-led government in re-
sponse to its refusal to abide with the three 
conditions set by the Middle East Quartet 
(composed of the United States, Russia, the 
UN, and the EU), that is, the recognition of 
Israel, the renunciation of violence, and the 
adherence to all previously signed agree-
ments between Israel and the Palestine Lib-
eration Organization. In addition, the Israeli 
government declared a full blockade of 
Gaza in the middle of June 2007, thus re-
stricting even further the import and ex-
port of goods and the movement of people. 
The small coastal strip (Gaza has an area 
of only 362 km2) is densely inhabited by 
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1.94 million people, with a strong popula-
tion growth (3.3 per cent). It is estimated 
that its population will reach 3 million by 
2030 and 4.8 million by 2050; 69 per cent 
of the population are refugees. Gaza is sur-
rounded by Israel, Egypt, and the Mediter-
ranean Sea. 
For its population, there are only two ways 
to exit: The first one is through the Erez 
Crossing, which connects Gaza with Israel 
and, therefore, theoretically enables travel 
to the West Bank, Jordan, and the world. 
However, since 2007 the Israeli authorities 
have allowed Palestinians to exit via Erez 
only in “exceptional humanitarian cases”, 
with an emphasis on urgent medical cases. 
Whereas in 2000 around half a million in-
habitants left Gaza every month through 
this checkpoint, this number declined to 
144,000 in 2016. Although Israel’s blockade 
policy has gone through different phases, 
it has never been oriented towards Gazans’ 
needs. 
The second way to exit Gaza is through 
the Rafah Crossing, which connects Gaza 
with Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula. Although the 
crossing has been sealed by the Egyptian 
authorities on principle since mid-2007, 
due to its non-recognition of and enmity 
with Hamas, Cairo has occasionally opened 
the crossing for humanitarian purposes. 
Thus, since then, the Rafah Crossing has 
operated for three to five days every two 
or three months, with individuals meeting 
certain criteria (e.g. for pilgrimages, stu-
dents in a third country, medical reasons, 
etc.) being allowed to exit. Whereas the 
monthly average number of entries and 
exits through the Rafah Crossing reached 
about 40,000 per month in 2005, it declined 
to 3,520 entries and exits per month in 2016. 
Economic and Social Impact 
The blockade of the Gaza Strip has not only 
imposed severe restrictions on the move-
ment of people, but it has also dramatically 
decreased the influx of goods. Israel has 
limited or denied entry for all materials 
that can be considered “dual-use”, meaning 
that they could be used for civilian pur-
poses such as reconstruction as well as the 
manufacturing of weapons. The import of 
wood, cement, iron, and many other goods 
has therefore been highly restricted. In 
2006, Dov Weisglass, then a senior advisor 
to Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, explained 
that the Israeli policy towards Gaza in reac-
tion to Hamas’ election victory was designed 
“to put the Palestinians on a diet, but not 
to make them die of hunger”. In 2012, an 
Israeli court ordered the release of a govern-
ment document that detailed “the number 
of calories Palestinians in Gaza need to con-
sume to avoid malnutrition”, a document 
that had served as a guideline to calculate 
the volume of imports allowed into Gaza. 
In addition, next to all export of goods has 
been banned. 
After the 2014 military confrontations, 
the Israeli government agreed to what 
became known as the “Gaza Reconstruction 
Mechanism” (GRM), which was adminis-
tered by the UN and was to regulate and 
supervise the flow of commodities into 
Gaza. Through the GRM, some construction 
materials have been allowed into Gaza, but 
sever restrictions remain. All in all, accord-
ing to a report by the Israeli NGO Gisha, the 
volume of imports has increased gradually 
since the worst years of the closure (2007–
2010), when everyday items such as chil-
dren’s toys and paper were blocked. 
From Legal to Black Economy 
Israel and the West Bank used to be Gaza’s 
main commercial partners. Cutting these 
economic ties by way of the blockade has 
resulted in a significant decrease in the pro-
duction levels of the local industries. They 
were replaced by organised smuggling 
through a complex system of tunnels under 
the Rafah border. Thus, the economic restric-
tions imposed by Israel led to a fundamen-
tal shift: It pushed the Gazan population 
to depend on tunnels to obtain all types 
of goods, ranging from milk and cement 
to stationery, clothes, and even fuel and 
cars. 
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Until June 2013, the number of tunnels 
was estimated to range from 450 to 1,200 
beneath the 12-km-long Gaza-Egypt border. 
The tunnels shifted the economic centre of 
the Gaza Strip from Gaza City to Rafah and 
triggered the emergence of a new business 
class, which made huge profits out of the 
tunnel trade and whose members came to 
be known as “the new millionaires”. The 
change from a legal to an illegal economy 
also affected the values and social princi-
ples that govern Gaza’s society. Although 
the latter perceived the tunnel trade to be 
illegal in the beginning, the business was 
promoted as a tool to challenge Israel’s 
occupation and, thus, started to gradually 
gain social acceptance. 
Realising that the tunnel trade could 
be a source of revenue that would enable 
it to overcome the financial boycott by the 
Palestinian Authority (PA) and many in 
the international community, the Hamas-
led government started to regulate the tun-
nel business by charging commissions on 
the smuggling as a replacement for regular 
income taxes. For example, from 2008 to 
2013, Hamas collected a tax of 10 shekel 
($2.50) for one ton of gravel, 20 shekel ($5) 
for one ton of cement, and 50 shekel 
($12.50) for one ton of metal. The launch 
of a new tunnel was taxed with around 
$2,800, and the tax for a smuggled car of 
around $6,000 in value was $1,000. All in 
all, it was estimated that the Gazan govern-
ment collected around half a billion US dol-
lars per year from various types of tunnel 
taxes. 
The tunnels thus became a major source 
of income for the Hamas-led government. 
Yet, starting in July 2013, the new leader-
ship in Egypt, headed by Abdel Fattah 
al-Sisi, ordered the tunnels to be destroyed. 
This campaign was aimed at exerting pres-
sure on Hamas. Since then, the Hamas-led 
government has suffered from a severe 
financial crisis, to the point that, in the 
last months, it has been unable to pay the 
salaries of its 40,000 public servants on 
time. To replace this source of revenue, it 
felt compelled to impose several types of 
other taxes, which has caused enormous re-
sentment among the population and led to 
a decrease in the government’s popularity. 
Palestinian Civil Society: 
Deepening Polarisation, New Roles 
The Palestinian factional division has put 
civil society’s independence to the test, as 
the rivalling parties have each applied pres-
sure to gain support for their cause and 
delegitimize their rival. At the same time, 
the split has reshaped civil society, con-
fronted it with new tasks, and equipped it 
with new tools. 
Many civil society organisations have 
tried to make use of their positions as non-
partisan mediators and grassroots mobilis-
ers in favour of reconciliation and over-
coming the intra-Palestinian split. Adapting 
their priorities, they have focussed on pre-
venting negative effects of Palestinian divi-
sions on society at large. The new functions 
of civil society that arose thus were media-
tion, bridge-building efforts, and the provi-
sion of visions, plans, and forums for debate 
on how to overcome the divide between 
the PA and Hamas. At the same time, many 
NGOs engaged in advocacy activities such 
as demonstrations, vigils, and the creation 
of networks and coalitions; capacity-build-
ing; and trainings aimed at overall sensi-
tisation for a culture of tolerance between 
the two camps. Palestinian civil society 
has therefore played a constructive role in 
achieving a modicum of stability and mod-
eration and in maintaining diversity. 
Yet, the factional split made the situa-
tion worse for civil society on many levels. 
The internal division led to the suspension 
of elections, to a significant increase in hu-
man rights violations by the two rivalling 
authorities, and to a curtailing of civil 
society activities. As a result, donor fund-
ing-priorities changed, too: More funds 
were directed to the PA in the West Bank 
and to humanitarian organisations, so as 
to bypass the Hamas-led government. In 
addition, banking was strongly affected by 
regulations from the two rivalling author-
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ities as well as third parties such as the 
United States and the EU, thus making 
financial transfers to civil society organisa-
tions in Gaza more difficult. Consequently, 
Palestinian civil society is today far less able 
to defend the people’s rights and cater to 
their needs than a decade ago. To continue 
fulfilling a moderating and balancing role, 
it needs financial and diplomatic support. 
Youth: From an Asset to a Burden 
Gaza’s youth – some 72 per cent of the 
population are younger than 30 years – 
have been particularly strongly affected by 
the Palestinian factional division and the 
blockade. The suspension of regular elec-
tions and of the work of the Palestinian 
Legislative Council (PLC) has deprived the 
youth of being able to actively participate 
politically and make their voices heard. 
Gaza’s youth have felt marginalised and 
neglected by the competing authorities. In 
addition, as Israel’s blockade policies gener-
ally deny youth to travel, they have been 
deprived from interacting with the outside 
world and from upgrading and modernis-
ing their knowledge and skills. Frustration, 
anger, and desperation are the main side-
effects. The lack of interaction with the out-
side world has also furthered fatalism and 
radicalisation among Gaza’s youth. 
No “Palestinian Spring” 
The Palestinian youth closely followed the 
youth-led upheavals of the so-called Arab 
Spring with great admiration. They hurried 
to copy the protests and methods, with the 
aim of bringing positive change to their en-
vironment. One of the first concrete actions 
was to call for mass protests – by using social 
media, as had been done in many other 
parts of the Arab world – to end the fac-
tional division. On 15 March 2011, thou-
sands of Palestinian youth gathered in the 
West Bank and Gaza, calling primarily to 
end the then four-year-old division. This 
outbreak of youth activism was positively 
welcomed by Palestinian society in general, 
but it was met with significant suspicion 
from the two authorities, which imposed 
severe restrictions that halted the move-
ment. 
Another call to demonstrations was ini-
tiated online on 11 November 2013 under 
the name “Tamarod” (Arabic for rebellion). 
The Tamarod movement was a copy-and-
paste attempt of the 2013 Egyptian experi-
ence that brought about the downfall of the 
Mohammed Mursi presidency. Yet, it failed 
to consider the Gaza Strip’s specificities – 
above all, the exclusive control of Hamas – 
and thus was not successful either. 
In general, the failure to bring about 
change through a “Palestinian Spring” was 
due to the inability of Palestinian youth to 
form a clear vision for the future, the lack 
of coordination between Gaza and West 
Bank youth, and the failure to agree upon 
demands and their prioritisation. Unlike 
their Arab counterparts, who confronted a 
single government in their endeavours to 
improve their situation, Palestinian youth 
were caught between the Israeli occupation, 
Fatah in the West Bank, and Hamas in Gaza. 
Despair Leads to Emigration and Suicide 
The continuous failure of Palestinian youth 
to improve their lot has pushed them to be-
come increasingly frustrated. A survey pub-
lished by the Palestinian Central Bureau 
of Statistics in August 2017 confirms that 
there is a growing desire among Palestinian 
youth to emigrate: About 24 per cent of the 
15- to 29-year-olds have a desire to emigrate. 
In Gaza, the percentage is even higher, at 
37 per cent, compared to only 15 per cent 
of the West Bank youth. To date, hundreds 
of Gazan youth have succeeded in escaping 
through the underground tunnels, seeking 
to migrate to Europe through the Alexan-
dria seaport. According to media accounts, 
in 2014 around 400 Palestinians lost their 
lives when their boats, bound for Europe, 
sank in the Mediterranean Sea. Another 
growing phenomenon in that context is 
that young people looking for jobs escape 
into Israel by jumping over – or cutting 
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through – the barbed wire fence surround-
ing the Strip. 
Yet another effect of the Gazan reality 
is a growing tendency among youth to 
commit suicide. In August 2017, Mohanned 
Younis, a 22-year-old pharmacology stu-
dent, voluntarily ended his life. Shockingly, 
a considerable number of Mohanned’s 
peers supported this decision. The incident 
came after a similar case in which a talented 
cartoonist, Moaz al-Hajj, hanged himself. 
These two incidents upset Gaza’s society 
and further highlighted the crisis Gazans 
are undergoing. 
Youth Turn to Radicalism 
As Palestinian youth realise that their 
efforts to change their situation by peace-
ful means have failed, many lose faith in 
moderation. This creates an environment 
in which radical groups can easily attract 
youth to their ideology. Some of these 
youth are invited by radical groups oper-
ating in the Sinai Peninsula to join them, 
either to fight against the Egyptian author-
ities or to travel on to fight in Iraq and 
Syria. Sinai also provides a training ground 
for those who escape Gaza through the 
tunnels to spread a jihadi ideology upon 
their return. According to the online plat-
form Al-Monitor, an estimated 100 young 
Gazans are reported to have joined the so-
called Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. The 
same report speaks of more than 1,000 
young Gazans who are ready to join the 
organisation, once they have the chance 
to exit Gaza. 
Dispute over Representing Political Islam 
In recent years, tensions between Hamas 
and radical Salafi groups have been grow-
ing and repeated clashes between them 
have occurred, followed by the arrests of 
hundreds of their members by Hamas 
forces. Open conflict broke out in August 
2009, when a group announced their 
affiliation with Al-Qaeda and declared the 
establishment of an Islamic emirate in a 
mosque in Rafah city. Hamas attacked the 
group, killed 21 of them, and damaged the 
mosque. Repeated attacks by these groups 
followed against internet cafés, women 
coiffeurs, sport clubs, summer camps, and 
the French cultural centre, aimed at chal-
lenging Hamas’ authority. On 17 August 
2017, a radical Salafist committed a suicide 
operation at the Rafah Crossing. He ex-
ploded himself after approaching a Hamas 
border police officer in Rafah, killing one 
Hamas official. After each of these incidents 
Hamas has demonstrated its control with 
a wave of arrests among Salafists in Gaza, 
exacerbating the existing frictions. These 
incidents, as well as Hamas’ reactions to 
them, have led to a state of fear among the 
people of Gaza. 
Disintegration of the 
Palestinian National Project 
Over the last decade, due to the factional 
division and the lack of substantial inter-
action between the two authorities and 
populations, the political, social, and eco-
nomic differences between Gaza and the 
West Bank have increased significantly, 
despite them having been foreseen as 
one political entity, according to the Oslo 
Accords from the 1990s. The division be-
tween Hamas and the PA has exceeded the 
political realm and brought about changes 
in other domains as well. It has had legal, 
economic, social, and cultural repercus-
sions and has negatively impacted on the 
Palestinian national project. 
Since 2007 more than 150 decrees have 
been issued by PA President Mahmoud 
Abbas, while the Hamas bloc in the PLC, 
which has continued to meet as a rump 
parliament, has issued and validated 50 
decrees. These decrees have created legal 
divisions between the two areas. 
At the same time, Gaza’s economy con-
tinues to weaken vis-à-vis the West Bank’s: 
The GDP per capita in Gaza is only 45 per 
cent that of the West Bank’s; the unemploy-
ment in Gaza has reached 42 per cent (where-
as it is 18 per cent in the West Bank); and 
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the poverty rate in Gaza is around 40 per 
cent, but 19 per cent in the West Bank. 
Food insecurity affects 47 per cent of the 
households in Gaza, whereas in the West 
Bank it affects 16 per cent. 
Moreover, Gazan society has grown 
apart from the rest of Palestinian society. 
The policy of restricting people’s movement 
between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
has led, among other effects, to a signifi-
cant decrease in contact between Palestin-
ians in the two parts of the Palestinian terri-
tory: Gaza and West Bank. There has been 
a growing feeling among the population 
in Gaza that they are no longer an integral 
part of the Palestinian national project. 
This has again triggered the debate about 
whether Gaza can be a separate political 
and territorial entity as a “mini” Palestinian 
state. In reality, the continued separation 
of the two Palestinian territories must be 
considered a serious threat to the unity – 
and the success – of the Palestinian national 
project. 
Regional Spillover Effects 
Gaza is too small, too dependent on its 
neighbours for resources and access, and 
too poor to cope with all of the abovemen-
tioned problems by itself. Also, Gaza’s prob-
lems cannot be contained within the Strip, 
especially as most of them are either gen-
erated or accelerated by external factors. 
Against the backdrop of high population 
growth, low economic performance, un-
employment, increasing radicalism, and 
the heavy presence of militant and armed 
groups, Gaza is on the brink of exploding 
internally – internal turmoil might come 
in the form of clashes between the people, 
armed groups, and the Hamas-led authority 
– or externally, as a new round of hostil-
ities with Israel is very likely. In this con-
text, radical groups have been trying to 
trigger a reaction from Israel by repeatedly 
launching homemade rockets into south-
ern Israel. 
The Prospect of the Two-state Settlement 
The hope for a two-state solution will vanish 
if the Palestinian leadership remains divided 
– with Hamas being considered a terrorist 
organisation by Israel and Egypt as well as 
other key international actors, and the PA 
not being able to claim to represent the 
Palestinian people and territories. Thus, in 
order to progress towards – and be able to 
implement – a two-state solution, Palestini-
an unity must be reached first and bring 
about a unified Palestinian leadership, one 
that would represent all Palestinians and be 
able to reach a final agreement with Israel 
to bring an end to the conflict. 
Reconciliation Efforts under 
Egyptian Lead 
During the period from June to September 
2017, surprising developments took place 
that might lead to positive changes: The 
Hamas leadership was twice invited to Cairo. 
During the first visit in June, they met with 
the Egyptian authorities and – even more 
astonishing – with their rival Mohammed 
Dahlan, the former Fatah security chief of 
Gaza, who had played a key role in trigger-
ing the armed clashes between Fatah and 
Hamas in 2007. 
Cairo aimed to utilise the financial crises 
of Hamas and its regional isolation to bring 
Hamas closer to its position and to distance 
it from its former ally, Qatar. In addition, 
Egypt changed its approach from viewing 
Hamas as an enemy to seeing it as a poten-
tial ally in fighting terrorism in Sinai. 
Hamas was offered a regular opening of the 
Rafah Crossing, the provision of fuel for the 
Gaza power plant, and international travel 
of its cadres via Egypt. In exchange, Hamas 
promised cooperation in securing the 
border with Sinai. 
During the second invitation to Cairo in 
September 2017, Hamas was also allowed 
to convene a meeting of its Political Bureau, 
including Hamas officials from the diaspora. 
After that meeting, Hamas announced the 
dissolution of its administrative committee, 
which had been formed in March 2017 to 
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govern the Gaza Strip and was perceived by 
the PA as a shadow government. In response, 
the PA took a series of severe measures 
against Gaza, for example the reduction of 
PA employees’ salaries by 30 per cent and 
decreasing the subsidies for Gaza’s electricity 
bill. The decision of Hamas to dissolve the 
administrative committee opened the way 
for the so-called consensus government of 
Rami Hamdallah to govern Gaza. Then, on 
11 October, a reconciliation deal between 
Hamas and Fatah was reached through 
Egyptian mediation. The deal provides for 
the PA to take over the government of Gaza 
as well as the deployment of the Presiden-
tial Guard to the Gaza crossings. 
Despite all these positive developments, 
the road to reconciliation is still long. All 
past experiences and efforts to bridge the 
divide, such as the Mecca Agreement (Feb-
ruary 2007), the Sanaa Declaration (March 
2008), the Cairo Agreement (May 2011), 
the Doha Declaration (February 2012), 
and the Shati Agreement (April 2014), 
were not successful in healing the rift. Still, 
the recent rapprochement between Hamas 
and Egypt and the reconciliation agree-
ment between Hamas and Fatah are sig-
nificant, as they can help contribute to-
wards defusing the tension between Hamas 
and the PA. If continued, these meetings 
might mark the beginning of a reconcilia-
tion process, especially if they entail elec-
tions for the parliament and the presi-
dency. 
Unlocking Gaza’s Economic Potential 
Despite all the man-made problems and 
challenges, Gaza has many assets that offer 
the potential for prosperity. Gaza lies at the 
crossroads between Asia and Europe and 
its population has a highly entrepreneurial 
spirit and a competent workforce with 
modern skills, often acquired during earlier 
employment at Israeli companies. Before 
the blockade, the comparatively modern 
agricultural sector exported large amounts 
of cash crops, such as carnations, straw-
berries, and vegetables, to the Israeli and 
European markets. Furniture and garments 
were manufactured and exported as well. 
The Strip could be turned into a haven of 
stability and prosperity rather than being 
aid-dependent and a threat to its neigh-
bours. “Global Palestine, Connected Gaza” – 
a study led by the Palestinian private sector 
with technical support from an interna-
tional consulting firm – envisages Gaza as 
a globally relevant, knowledge-based, and 
resource-efficient economy pursuing oppor-
tunities in high value-added services and 
niche manufacturing, trade, and transport, 
with tourism and agricultural activities 
expected to play an important role. Ulti-
mately, Gaza could also be developed into 
a regional hub for IT industries, as there 
already are several small companies in Gaza 
that have established cooperation agree-
ments with big IT companies such as Micro-
soft and Google. 
In addition, Gaza boasts natural gas 
resources, both inland and offshore, with 
two gas reservoirs already having been dis-
covered in the Mediterranean. The idea of 
expanding Gaza by building small islands 
in the Mediterranean has been debated do-
mestically and internationally. Those small 
islands would help to ease pressures result-
ing from the population density and could 
be used for production facilities and tourism. 
To revive and utilise its potential, Gaza 
must be reopened for trade, including by 
building a small port and a regional airport 
that would connect Gaza to the rest of the 
world. A significant Palestinian diaspora 
would be ready to invest in – and contrib-
ute to – the development of Gaza and the 
Palestinian territories, once the current 
obstacles have been removed. 
Recommendations 
The blockade imposed by Israel, the Pales-
tinian factional division, and the severe 
humanitarian crisis in Gaza are not natural 
disasters that must be accepted. The inter-
national community should intervene in a 
determined and swift fashion to prevent 
the collapse of Gaza. Given the opportunity 
SWP Comments 42 
October 2017 
8 
offered by steps towards reconciliation 
between Hamas and the PA, this might 
just be the right moment for the EU to act. 
Germany is in a good position to start and 
lead such an initiative, utilising its central 
position within the EU and international 
politics, its unique relations with Israel, 
and the very positive image that Germany 
has acquired in the Middle East due to its 
welcoming policy towards refugees in 2015. 
Two types of simultaneous interventions 
are advisable: at the humanitarian and devel-
opmental as well as the political levels. 
Humanitarian and Developmental 
Immediate intervention is needed to sus-
tainably solve the crisis concerning the 
water and electricity supply in Gaza, the 
lack of medical facilities, and to address the 
high level of youth unemployment. In this 
context, it is key to lift the blockade, that 
is, to allow the movement of people and 
reopen Gaza for trade; support projects 
that promote green, self-sufficient energy 
sources (such as solar energy); and support 
the private sector, which would create jobs. 
Also, support for Palestinian civil society – 
aimed at restoring civic education and advo-
cacy for reconciliation, peace, and human 
rights – is important to rebuild the fabric 
of Palestinian society. 
In addition, steps should be taken to un-
lock Gaza’s full economic potential. In this 
regard, reconstruction of a Gazan seaport, 
exploration of the gas fields, and jump-
starting the export industry are among the 
key measures to be supported. 
Support for the Domestic Political Process 
The international community should help 
Palestinian factions to see the implementa-
tion of reconciliation agreements through. 
This includes elections that would restore 
the democratic process and bring new le-
gitimacy to the PA, the PLC, and the Presi-
dency. In this context, the PA should pro-
mulgate the draft law that would regulate 
the formation of political parties. Ahead 
of elections, political movements should 
transform themselves into legal political 
parties with clear and written bylaws. The 
would-be elected Palestinian leadership 
should declare its readiness to enter into 
peace negotiations with Israel that aim to 
reach a final agreement and end the conflict. 
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